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Since the Vietnam War era, Congress has entered the field of diplo-
macy with a vengeance. Members of Congress and their staffs have
examined the details of continuing negotiations over Spanish base
rights (1976), the Panama Canal treaties (1976), and the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT II, 1979), among examples.' As Crabb and
Holt note, "The novel feature of Congress' involvement in diplomatic
negotiations today is the tendency of legislators to engage in them inde-
pendently without White House approval, and sometimes in the face of
presidential opposition."2
This independence is evident in the recent dispute over the proper
dispensation of several tons of gold held by the United States, but
claimed by Czechoslovakia. The history of this diplomatic dispute,
stretching over three decades, is punctuated by two major legislative
interventions, one in 1974 and a second in 1980, which reveal a funda-
mental divergence between the executive and legislative branches in
the conduct of diplomacy.
Throughout the negotiations with Czechoslovakia on the gold issue,
the Department of State emphasized the improvement of United
States-Czechoslovakia relations. In sharp contrast, legislators en-
couraged hard bargaining, spurred by vocal constituents whose
financial claims against Czechoslovakia depended on the outcome of
the negotiations. These competing approaches can be characterized as
a clash between the national interest and private interests. The State
Department perspective is global, with questions of reapproachment
and detente paramount, while the legislative view is local, with ques-
tions of constituency representation and re-election foremost.
Many legislative forays into the field of diplomacy have been chal-
lenged as unwarranted and misguided, and have raised serious inquir-
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1. See C. CRABB & P. HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND
FOREIGN POLICY (1980); T. FRANK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS (1979).
2. C. CABB & P. HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY 200 (1980). For example, in November, 1979, American television viewers had
the opportunity to watch Representative George Hansen (R.-Idaho) conducting personal ne-
gotiations with Iran for the release of the fifty-five United States citizens held as hostages.
Id
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ies regarding who is at the helm of the ship of state.' This article
attempts to show, however, that the role of Congress in this dispute.
though often frustrating to the executive branch, has served two useful
purposes. First, Congress has acted as a fiduciary Seeking to protect the
financial interests of a significant number of American citizens and
firms with outstanding claims against Czechoslovakia; and, second,
Congress has acted as a catalyst accelerating the State Department
moves toward a resolution of the dispute.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES--CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CLAIMS DISPUTE
A. The Tripartite Commission Agreement of 1946
In March 1939, Hitler's armies invaded Czechoslovakia and seized
43.4 metric tons of gold in bars and ingots stored in the vaults of the
National Bank in Prague. When the Allied forces swept into the Third
Reich in 1945, 24.5 metric tons of this gold were discovered in the
Rhine city of Aachen bearing the seal of the Czechoslovakia National
Bank.4
On January 14, 1946, eighteen countries affected by Nazi depreda-
tion, including Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, and the United
States, signed the Paris Reparations Agreement of 1946. - This Agree-
ment provided for the pooling of all the monetary gold found in Ger-
many, then for its return to the rightful owners. To carry out this
function, the United States, Great Britain, and France, the occupying
powers, signed the Tripartite Commission Agreement on September 27,
1946, establishing the Tripartite Commission.6
Six tons of gold were handed over immediately to the Edward
Benes government of Czechoslovakia. In 1949, the Benes government
fell and was replaced by a Communist government which nationalized
firms and property belonging to United States citizens. President Tru-
man curbed the further transfer of gold to Czechoslovakia and blocked
all other Czech assets in the United States including steel mill equip-
ment purchased but not delivered, until the property claims of United
States citizens were settled. This action froze the 8.4 metric tons of gold
stored in the United States, while 10.5 metric tons were similarly frozen
by the British Government.7
3. See Rogers, Iflor in Charge of Foreign Policy?, N.Y. Times. Sept. 9, 1979, (Magazine). at 44.
4- Agence France-Presse, Prague, Czechoslovakia, Sept. 7, 1979 (press release), published in
Hartford Current, Sept. 7, 1980. at 22.
5. 61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S. No. 1655.
6: Id
7. See Settlement of Claims Against Czechoslovakia- Hearings and Markup on H. R. 7338 Refore
the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East and the Subcomm. on International Economic
Polic' and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as 1980 House Claims Hearings].
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B. The Czechoslovak Claims Act of 1958
The expropriation of American ,properties by Czechoslovakia in
1949 was followed by a series of unsuccessful efforts by the State De-
partment to secure a settlement of this matter. That year Czechoslova-
kia agreed, in principle, to a lump-sum payment to settle these United
States claims. Two attempts, however, to negotiate specific terms, one
in 1949 and another in 1955, proved fruitless.8
The deepening cold war provided little incentive for compromise;
United States parties, moreover, may have had unrealistic expectations
of a high settlement figure in mind, based on the fact that Yugoslavia
had just negotiated similar claims with the United States for ninety-one
cents on the dollar for the principal amount.9 Neither Czechoslovakia
nor any other Eastern European nation against which we had claims
was prepared to follow the Yugoslavian lead.' °
According to a State Department representative, the high settlement
with Yugoslavia resulted because the United States held sizable assets,
including the total value of frozen Yugoslavian gold, which was worth
forty-two million dollars at the time, while the claims amounted to only
seventeen million dollars. Also, Yugoslavia had just withdrawn from
the Cominform and "was very eager to improve its relationship with
the United States.''
In agreements reached in 1950 and 1956, the French settled with the
Czechs for approximately sixty percent of their original claim; the Brit-
ish appeared willing to barter as well.' 2 In neither case, however, were
our allies willing to relinquish actual gold holdings to Czechoslovakia,
pointing to the Tripartite Commission Agreement provision that "deci-
sions of the Commission shall be by unanimous agreement of its mem-
bers.""3  In other words, the stalled United States-Czechoslovakia
negotiations prevented the release of the Czechoslovakian gold stored
in the United States and England.
This stalemate led the Eisenhower Administration to recommend in
1958 that Congress authorize the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion, which was established by the International Claims Settlement Act
of 1949.14 to adjudicate claims of United States citizens against Czecho-
8. Czechoslovak42 Claims Settlement- Executive Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Fi-
nance. 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Claims Hearings].
9. /9S0 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7, at 170 (State Department memorandum).
10. Id.
I1. Id at 22 (statement of Robert L. Barrie, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs,
Department of State). The Communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hun-
gary. Rumania, Bulgaria, France, Italy, and the Soviet Union established the Cominform, or
"Communist Information Bureau" in Poland in 1947 to disseminate propaganda against the
United States.
12. Id at 62 (statement of Robert L. Barrie).
13. See Paris Reparations Agreement, Jan. 14, 1946, at part 11, para. 6, 61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S.
No. 1655.
14. international Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. §§ 16 2 1-16 4 2 p (1976).
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slovakia. 15 Congress moved quickly on this recommendation and on
August 8, 1958, Pub. L. 85-604 was signed into law. 6 Prompted by
Czech intransigence and claimant pressure, Congress gave this statute
sharp teeth. The law authorized the use of the $8.5 million proceeds
from the seizure and sale of the United States-held Czech steel mill
equipment forpro rata payments to claimants holding awards, if within
one year following enactment of the statute no settlement had been
reached. '"
No settlement was reached and the proceeds were distributed to the
2,630 claimants validated by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion. The arithmetic of the dispute then looked like this: with a princi-
pal total of seventy-two million dollars for all the awards, plus six
percent per annum interest from 1949 to 1958, the total debt owed by
Czechoslovakia was approximately $113.6 million.' 8 Payment of $8.5
million from the steel mill proceeds reduced the sum to $105 million
outstanding, with no settlement, or even negotiations, in sight.
C. The Trade Act of 1974
In the two decades from 1960 to 1980, the Department of State
twice initiated ad referendum agreements with Czechoslovakia, once in
1963 and again in 1974. The agreements were not implemented, ob-
serves an executive branch official, "primarily because they were
viewed by Congress as providing insufficient compensation by the
claimants."' 9 The primary congressional opponent of these agreements
was Senator Russell B. Long (D.-La.), the most ardent spokesman for
the afflicted claimants and Chairman of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, which has jurisdiction over claims involving the United States.
Other members of this Committee were also dissatisfied with the inabil-
ity of the State Department to obtain full payment for the claimants.2 °
The Finance Committee moved quickly to change this situation. In
an unprecedented legislative intervention into trade negotiations, the
Finance Committee added Section 408 to the Trade Act of 1974 which
directed the Administration to renegotiate a claims settlement with
Czechoslovakia satisfactory to the Congress. This section also ex-
pressly prohibited United States consent to the release of any'Czecho-
15. 1980 House Claims Hearings. supra note 7, at 19.
16. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. 85-604, 72 Stat. 527-530 (1958) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1642-
1642p (1976)) (amending the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 1621-1624, 1626. 1627).
17. Since the steel mill equipment was deteriorating, the Treasury Department liquidated it in
1954. See H. REP. No. 2227, 85th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1958).
18. 1974 Senate Claims Hearings, supra note 8, at II (statements of Fabian Kwiatek. Assistant
Legal Advisor to John Armitage, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs).
19. 1980 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7, at 15-16 (statement of Russell L. Munk, Assistant
General Counsel, International Affairs, Department of the Treasury).
20. See, e.g.. 1974 Senate Claims Hearings, supra note 8, at 41-44 (remarks of Sen. Robert Byrd
(D.-Va.) & Sen. Michael Gravel (D.-Ala.)).
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slovakian gold in the custody of the Tripartite Commission.2
Congress had elected to become a full partner in the settlement of
claims against Czechoslovakia. The 1974 ad referendum agreement
was, in effect, vetoed by the Senate Finance Committee, and the De-
partment of State was put on notice that the gold belonging to Czecho-
slovakia would not be released until the American claimants received
more than forty-two percent on the principal of their awards.22
The State Department's pursuit of detente with the Soviet bloc, per-
haps at its zenith in 1974, was dealt a blow by Congress in the name of
constituent rights. "We are going to protect our citizens," Senator
Long declared to State Department officials. "It is my guess. . . that if
we act like tough Yankee traders of old, we get these claims paid off
one hundred cents on the dollar."23
This blow, though, was milder than a remedy which earlier crossed
the mind of the Finance Chairman and others. Remembering the
Czech steel mill sale, Senator Long advised the State Department dur-
ing 1974 hearings:
If I had your job, I would not negotiate with that Communist Gov-
ernment in Czechoslovakia, I would negotiate with the British and
French. I would say, let us just split their gold up and we will take part
of it and you take the rest, and what we have got we will divide among
our people, and you divide what you have got among your people, and
we will distribute it.
24
The committee backed away from this position, in deference to the
State Department's legal opinion that sale of the gold would violate
international law, principally, the Tripartite Commission's custodial re-
lationship to this gold.
This retreat from outright sale to the more moderate veto provision
of Section 408 provided only limited succor to the State Department.
Rejection of the forty-two cents agreement would lead to the collapse
of negotiations with Czechoslovakia, predicted a Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of State for European Affairs, adding that "we would not have
any opportunity to get a better solution from the Czechs in the immedi-
"125ate future . ...
D. Fortuna
It was a prescient prediction, for negotiations did collapse and
United States-Czechoslovakia relations, never cordial, cooled further.
But Machiavelli'sfortuna prepared the way for an intriguing legislative
initiative to resolve this impasse. The good fortune, at least from the
claimants' point of view, came in the form of spiraling gold prices.
21. Trade Act of 1974, § 408, 19 U.S.C. § 2438 (1976).
22. 1974 Senate Claims Hearings, supra note 8, at 4, 5, 19, 39.
23. Id., at 51 (remarks of Sen. Long).
24. 1974 Senate Claims Hearings, supra note 8, at 7.
25. Id (statements of John Armitage).
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The value of the Czech gold held by the members of the Tripartite
Commission rose from approximately twenty million dollars in 1946 to
$364.5 million by 1980. The portion held by the United States climbed
in value from $11.5 million to some $163 million, fifty-eight million
dollars over the $105 million sought by the claimants in 1974 as full
26payment.
Lawrence Chamberlain persuasively documents how most legisla-
tive proposals are born in the offices of interest groups.17 The leap in
the value of gold gave one of the claimant attorneys an inspiration.
Why not sell all the Czech gold, or at least that portion held by the
United States, invest the proceeds, pay off the claimants with the inter-
est accrued, then return the principal to the Czechoslovakians, a cash
amount significantly greater than the original value of the gold in 1946?
The State Department was as unenamored of this plan as it had been of
Senator Long's earlier suggestion that the Tripartite Commission sim-
ply sell the gold and divide the proceeds. The stage was set for another
round in the tug of war between Congress and the State Department.
II. THE NEW INITIATIVE
A. The 1980 House Hearings
1. H.R. 7338
Lester A. Wolff (D.-N.Y.) introduced this legislative brainstorm as
H.R. 7338. Although a member of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Representative Wolff was not on one of the subcommittees
which could hold hearings on the United States-Czechoslovakia claims
issue--either the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and
Trade or the Subcommittee on Western Europe and the Middle East.
As it happened, the chairmen of both these subcommittees, Jonathan B.
Bingham (D.-N.Y.) and Lee H. Hamilton (D.-Ind.), were interested in
reviewing the issue. In the Senate, the Finance Committee continued
to be a key arena for discussion on the dispute. A new committee
member, Daniel P. Moynihan (D.-N.Y.), became an active voice on
this issue.28
On August 19, 1980, the Bingham and Hamilton Subcommittees
joined forces to take public testimony from Congressman Wolff, State
and Treasury Department spokesmen, claimants, and claimant attor-
neys. The specific focus of the hearing was H.R. 7338, the Wolff bill
designed to convert into law the ingenious formula advanced by the
26. See Id at 32 (statement of Edward L. Merrigan, counsel for claimant). See also 1Q80 1iou'e
Claims Hearings, supra note 7, at 3, 17.
27. Chamberlain. The President, Congress, and Legislation, 61 POL. Sc-i. Q. 42 (1946). See alwo
Moe and Teel, Congress as Polic;-Maker: 4 Necessary Reappraisal, 85 POL. Sctl. Q. 443
(1970).
28. Interviews with staff members of Representatives Bingham and Hamilton. and Senator Mov-




claimant attorneys. Wolff spoke avidly on behalf of the bill saying,
"What I want to accomplish by this legislation is to secure a fair pay-
ment for those claimants who have waited so long for their
compensation. "29
State and Treasury officials took their seats at the witness table fol-
lowing Wolff. They wasted no time in arriving at their objections to
H.R. 7338, with its plan to sell the Czech gold. The State Department
spokesman said that the Department was approaching new negotia-
tions with Czechoslovakia, which were apt to lead to "a very substan-
tial cash payment" by the Czechs, allowing quicker compensation to
the claimants than through the slow accretion of interest under the
Wolff proposal.30
The Treasury spokesman agreed that the payment to claimants
under the Wolff formula might take one or two decades, depending on
interest rates, and it was "unlikely" that Tripartite gold outside the
United States could be used.3 The State Department pleaded for "an-
other few months" to see if an acceptable compromise could be reached
with Czechoslovakia.32 Privately, Carter administration officials con-
ceded that the Wolff bill had stirred the State Department and Prague
toward re-opening negotiations before this draft formula became law.33
The subcommittees drew one conclusion from the Carter Adminis-
tration's testimony: its case was terribly weak. Its spokesmen had
failed in 1974 and now again in 1980 to present any arguments other
than suggestions that unilateral action by the United States would vio-
late the Tripartite Commission Agreement.34
Despite their sympathies for detente, Representatives Bingham and
Hamilton and their colleagues left the hearing room with serious reser-
vations about the State Department's position. The Administration's
presentation rested on the hope that, thirty years after the original con-
fiscation program, the Czechs would finally agree to a settlement ac-
ceptable to Congress. In contrast to the Carter Administration's
testimony, Bingham and Hamilton had been obviously impressed by
the claimants and by the thorough research of their attorneys.
35
2 The State Department Legal Memorandum
Part of the State Department's reluctance to emphasize its position
during the hearings stemmed from a concern that a formal statement
29. 1 980 House Clainis Hearings, supra note 8, at 5.
30. Id at 9 (statement of Robert L. Barrie).
31. Id at 17 (statement of Russell L. Munk).
32. Id at 26 (statement of Robert L. Barrie).
33. Interview with State Department desk officer for Czechoslovakia and a Department legal
counsel. Aug. 1980. Washington, D.C. Both requested anonymity.
34. 194 Senate Claims Hearings, supra note 8. at 10 (statement of Fabian Kunetek): 1980 House
Claims Hearings. supra note 7. at 9 (statements of Robert L. Barrie and Russell L. Munk).
35. Interviews with staff of Representatives Bingham and Hamilton, Aug. 19-20, 1980, Washing-
ton. D.C. For an indication of the subcommittees' views of the Administration's arguments,
see 1980 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7. at 56.
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would only serve to provide the Czechs with more propaganda against
the Congress, perhaps one day in a court of law. The State Depart-
ment, under pressure from the House Subcommittees, subsequently
presented more concrete arguments against the Wolff proposal. Its cen-
tral argument was based on the rule of unanimity in the 1946 Tripartite
Agreement: the United States simply could not act unilaterally. 6 Ac-
cording to the State Department, the British and the French had no
intention of allowing the sale of Czechoslovakia's gold because this
would "violate the governing international agreements." Statements
from the British and the French were provided to the subcommittees by
the State Department to emphasize this point. The French were partic-
ularly emphatic:
The mere fact that the United States Congress could claim its own
competence to legislate on that issue would constitute a serious breach
of the universally recognized norms of international law. It is out of
the question for France to admit that domestic law overrules interna-
tional commitments.37
Further, the French and the British were apparently unwilling to bend
on the specific reference in the Paris Reparation Agreement to the resti-
tution of the gold, not the cash value of that gold as stipulated in H.R.
7338.38 As the French statement put it, the 1946 Agreement "clearly
puts forward the principle of 'immunity' concerning the gold .... -
The State Department also addressed the "doctrine of retorsion."
The claimant attorneys made this doctrine a pivotal issue in their case,
citing an eighteenth century legal authority:
When a sovereign is not satisfied with the way in which his subjects are
treated by the laws and customs of another Nation, he is at liberty to
announce that he will follow the same policy, with respect to the sub-
jects of that Nation, which that Nation is following with respect to his
subjects. This is what is called retorsion, and it is in every way in keep-
ing with justice and sound statesmanship.
40
The claimants argued that since Czechoslovakia violated international
law by nationalizing the properties of United States citizens without
payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, this interna-
tional transgression by Czechoslovakia provided legal jurisdiction for
retaliation. Seizure of the gold and its sale on the open market was,
therefore, entirely appropriate.4'
36. "Decisions of the Commission shall be by unanimous agreement of its members." Paris
Reparations Agreement, Jan. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S. No. 1655. The State Depart-
ment legal opinion may be found in 1980 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7. at 28-5 1.
37. 1980 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7, at 24 (written statement of the French Embassy,
introduced by State Department spokesmen).
38. Supra note 5.
39. 1980 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7, at 24 (written statement of the French Embassy.
introduced by State Department spokesmen).
40. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 228 (1964 trans. of 1758 ed.); See 1980 House Clatm
Hearings, supra note 7, at 198 (class brief of claimants presented by attorney Harry McPher-
son); E. LAuTERPACHT, OPPENHEIMS INTERNATtONAL LAW 354 (7th ed. 1952).
41. 1980 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7, at 192-201.
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This, however, was "not legally correct," said the State Depart-
ment.42 In the first place, the appropriate doctrine was "reprisal." not
retorsion, since the latter was a "process of political retaliation, not a
legal defense. 4 3 Moreover, reprisal itself is applicable only when cer-
tain conditions are met: the reprisal action is taken in response to a
breach of international law by another State; antecedent efforts to solve
the dispute through negotiation and other peaceful means have failed;
and, the reprisal actions must be reasonably proportional to the injury
suffered.44
The State Department argued that these requirements had not been
satisfied in the Czechoslovakian gold case, despite that nation's breach
of international law in 1949. The means of settlement had not yet been
satisfied, and the past conduct of the Czechoslovakians failed to indi-
cate an unwillingness to arrive at a settlement. The State Department
memorandum reminded Congress that it was the United States legisla-
ture. not the government of Czechoslovakia, which had shot down the
last negotiated agreement in 1974. Further, the State Department was
sufficiently confident of a successful new round that it had tabled a
proposal for fresh negotiations with Czechoslovakia. So, concluded the
Department of State, "the United States could not effectively maintain
at this juncture that settlement of its claims through negotiations or
other peaceful means is impossible, or that all reasonable efforts to this
end have been attempted and failed."45
?. The Claimant Attorneys
The claimant representatives disputed the State Department's inter-
pretation of the word "decisions" in the unanimity principle of the 1946
Agreement. The State Department argued that, while the word was
never defined by the Agreement, it "was intended to have an expansive
meaning."114" The claimant attorneys, however, had quite a different in-
terpretation: the controversial word referred to "adjudicatory" deci-
sions. e.g., scrutinizing claims or determining shares, not decisions
related to the actual distribution of the gold.4 7 "The status of this mat-
ter is clear," they reasoned in a joint legal brief, "all the necessary
unanimous decisions were rendered thirty years ago; and Czechoslova-
42. Id at 40 iState Department brief).
43 ld at 41 (State Department brief). Reprisals are defined as "'such injurious or otherwise
internationally illegal acts of one State against another as are exceptionally permitted for the
purpose of compelling the latter to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created
by its orn international delinquency. ... [Rleprisals are acts. otherwise illegal. performed
hN a State for the purpose of obtaining justice for an international delinquency by taking the
latw into its own hands .... Reprisals are admissable ...in all ...cases of an interna-
tional delinquency for which the injured State cannot get reparation through negotiations, or
other amicable means. ... LAUTERPACHT. supra note 40. at 136.
44. Sec ' Waldluck. The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law.
8 1 Ri 'ULiiL DLS COURs 455. 458-60 (1952).
4. 1980 Hlouse Claims IHearings, supra note 7. at 43 (State Department brief).
40. Id. at 36.
47. Id. at 204.
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kia's title to twenty-four tons of gold was restored in a unanimous allo-
cation . . The Commission accomplished its central mission, and no
further substantive decisions are required."48
The claimant attorneys proposed an alternative to the cash-value
plan of H.R. 7338. In an amendment to the Wolff bill, Czechoslovakia
could be granted the right of first refusal to purchase the gold.4 As for
the doctrine of reprisal, the attorneys concluded that: "All tests have
been met. Thirty-year-old stalemate is not the prompt, adequate com-
pensation required by international law."5
Though a few additional legal issues were advanced by both sides,
they were secondary. The battle lines were now drawn more clearly
than ever before in the long history of this dispute.
4. Staff Recommendations
The legislative staff attempted to draw some conclusions from these
arguments to guide Representatives Bingham and Hamilton. One key
House staffer admitted candidly that he was unable to choose between
the State Department and the claimants on legal grounds, since both
sides had advanced "post-hoc legal justifications for pre-existing policy
positions."5' In his view, the Subcommittees were confronted "basi-
cally with a policy issue, and that, faced with conflicting legal argu-
ments, we should determine our course of action on policy grounds
• . . that is, whether legislation-or the threat of it-in this case is good
policy."52
Another staffer assigned to the case saw merit in aspects of both the
State Department's and the claimant attorneys' legal briefs, but con-
cluded that in a court of law the former's interpretation of the Tripar-
tite unanimity principle was apt to prevail. He noted, however, that the
legal arguments presented a "close call," and was secondary at any rate
for purposes of evaluating H.R. 7338 to questions of "common sense,
humanity, and politics."53
Common sense spoke for the bill, according to this staff aide, "be-
cause the procedure in H.R. 7338 eventually pays off everyone." More-
over, it was "common sense to realize that these negotiations have gone
on long enough." As for a sense of humanity, the award holders were
elderly and, in some cases, needy.
4
Politics entered the scene through two doors, one marked "local"
and the other "international." It was obviously good local politics to
help constituents, and from the State Department's point of view it was
48. Id at 205.
49. 1980 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7 (Memorandum from claimant attorneys dated
September 9, 1980).
50. ld
5I. LegalAnalysis of Czech Claims Issue, (Sept. 18, 1980) (staff memorandum to Rep. Bingham).
52. Id
53. Whither the Czech Claims Dispute, (Aug. 25, 1980) (staff memorandum to Rep. Bingham).
54. Id.; See, e.g., 1980 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7, at 66-67, 88-90.
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good international politics to improve relations with an important na-
tion in the Soviet bloc. The staffer concluded that State's political ar-
gument was overrated. "The Czechs will overcome their unhappiness
with the Wolff bill and accept the payment at the end of the rainbow,
even if it isn't a pot of gold," he advised, "either that, or they will take
more seriously a negotiated settlement.""
B. Markup of H.R. 7338
On September 30, 1980, a month after the hearings on H.R. 7338,
the two House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees convened again to draft
an amended version of the original Wolff bill. The amended H.R. 7338
would extend the negotiating deadline from 60 to 180 days; approxi-
mately one-fifth metric tons of coins and other items of historic value to
the Czechoslovakians would be returned to Czechoslovakia; the
Czechoslovakians would have the first opportunity to purchase the rest
of the gold; and, some new claimants would be recognized (beyond the
2,630 claimants originally permitted to present their claims), with
claims against Czechoslovakian confiscation policies between 1946-48
and after 1958.56
Finally, to enhance the incentives for Czechoslovakia to reach a ne-
gotiated settlement with the United States before the Wolff formula
went into effect, an amendment was offered to ease the requirement in
Section 408 of the 1974 Trade Act requiring the approval of Congress
on any United States-Czechoslovakia settlement. The amendment pro-
vided that failure to adopt a concurrent resolution of disapproval
should be deemed approval by Congress of a settlement agreement, re-
ducing the chances that Congress could strike down a "reasonable"
settlement. 7
The claimants' attorneys privately vowed to defeat this staff propo-
sal. They believed this approach significantly increased the likelihood
that the State Department would reach a low settlement, in a belief this
new provision would make a congressional veto difficult. The members
of the subcommittees were not strongly wedded to either point of view,
and the amendment passed with the understanding that this provision
could be easily changed in full committee markup if anyone felt
strongly about it."
In fact, none of the amendments provoked controversy during the
sparsely attended subcommittees' markup. Within twenty minutes the
amended Wolff bill had been approved by the Subcommittee on Eu-
rope and the Middle East, and the Subcommittee on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade, with only one dissenting vote. 9
55. Whither the Czech Claims Dispute, supra note 53.
56. 1980 House Claims Hearings, supra note 7, at 150-51.
57. Id
58. See. e.g., Id., at 151. 153 (statements of Representative Bingham).
59. Id. at 158.
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The dissenter, Representative Millicent Fenwick (R.-N.J.), objected
not to the amendments but to the Wolff formula itself. To her, it was a
"messy arrangement." She thought rather that "it would be far simpler
if we could persuade our allies to allow us to sell the gold to satisfy
whatever is considered a.just proportion of the claim; and return the
balance."6 Chairman Bingham told Representative Fenwick that
State Department officials still had several months to attempt her ap-
proach, even after the bill became law, if they wished, but "there is no
way that we can compel them to do that."'"
The next step for H.R. 7338 was to be a markup by full committee
in November 1980. The crush of legislative business in an election
year, coupled with Bingham's and Hamilton's belief that their subcom-
mittees' markup had gotten the point across to the State Department
and to the government of Czechoslovakia, kept the Wolff bill off the
full Committee agenda.62
C. Repercussions
During the 1980 hearings, Bingham, Hamilton, and Fenwick sent a
clear signal that the State Department should come back soon with a
deal considerably better than the 1974 agreement or see the Wolff bill
become law. Still convinced that H.R. 7338 could turn United States-
Czechoslovakia relations to rubble, State Department officials vowed
privately they would do their best to achieve an agreement Congress
would accept.3
Just exactly what was acceptable remained unclear, since no mem-
ber of Congress had stated a specific dollar figure that absolutely had to
be achieved. Among the figures provided to the Congress on earlier
settlements, however, only the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian examples,
ninety-one percent and seventy-three percent of principal respectively,
had drawn praise on Capitol Hill. (See Table 1). The historical lesson
in these figures was probably not lost on the legislators: sizable assets
held by the United States provided excellent leverage toward a satisfac-
tory settlement."
The concept of "full payment" was actually built into the Wolff bill.
To some, this meant one hundred percent of the principal; to others,
the phrase meant that plus interest through 1980. Generally, though,
most legislators close to the issue seemed to think the State Department
would impress Senator Long only if it obtained ninety percent of prin-
cipal, or close to it, along with a reasonably short payment period, i.e.,
immediate cash or a short installment plan. Skepticism abounded that
60. Id, at 152.
61. Id, at 153.
62. Interviews with staffs of Representatives Bingham and Hamilton, November 1980, Washing-
ton, D.C. [hereinafter November Staff Interview].
63. Interview with State Department desk officer for Czechoslovakia, Nov. 1980. Washington.
D.C.
64. Nov. Staff Interview, supra note 62.
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Czechoslovakia would agree to such a settlement."5
Czechoslovakia received the same message of impatience sent by
Congress to the State Department via the 1980 hearings and markups.
Three Czech diplomats attended and taped these hearings. In late Oc-
tober, 1980, an official letter was delivered to the Congressional leader-
ship from the President of the Czechoslovakia Federal Assembly.
66
The Assembly, noted the letter, had followed the Wolff initiative with
"utmost uneasiness." Czechoslovakia was not at fault for earlier
aborted negotiations. The 1974 agreement, for example, fell through
"due to actions you no doubt know about. ''1 7 There were "people en-
deavoring to distort the facts" and to encourage the United States to
violate solemn international agreements, even though "such actions
would condemn Czechoslovakia-United States relations to long term
and futile stagnation at an unprecedented level."6 The Wolff propo-
sal, if successful, concluded the Czech official, would be "condemned
by world opinion and even the future generation of your country would
have to blush when recalling such an act." 9
In short, Czechoslovakia did not want its gold sold. Less clear was
just how willing Czechoslovakian officials were to halt this course of
events by striking a satisfactory bargain. According to the letter, they
were ready for the "resumption of constructive talks, free of menace
and pressure."7 Regardless of how these talks went, one thing was
certain: the clock was running on Capitol Hill.
CONCLUSION
Elections in the United States bring a certain slippage in the legisla-
tive process. Members go home, face the voters, and are either re-
turned or retired. For Lester A. Wolff, caught up apparently in a rising
tide of conservatism that swept his and many other districts, the verdict
spelled retirement. Whether he had won or lost, H.R. 7338 would have
rested on the shelf anyway for a few months as Congress passed
through the legislative lapse associated with elections, post-election
holidays, and the start up of a new session. The clock continued to run
on the American claims against Czechoslovakia, however, as House
and Senate staffers monitored the negotiations through periodic tele-
phone calls to the Department of State. Despite Wolff's departure, the
purposes of his bill remained alive.
65. Interviews with staffs of Representatives Wolff. Bingham. Hamilton, and Fenwick. Nov.
1980. Washington. D.C.
66. Official Letter from Alois Indra, President of the Federal Assembly of the Czechoslavak
Socialist Republic, to Thomas O'Neill, Jr.. Speaker of the House (Oct. 27, 1980) (files of the
Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on International Economic Policy and
Trade).







During this congressional interregnum, State Department officials
approached Czechoslovakia with a request for full payment on the
principal owed, plus interest through 1958, $105 million. Czechoslova-
kia countered with an offer of $43.5 million, or sixty percent of the
principal alone (seventy-two million dollars). While this was over
double the $20.5 million offered in 1974, the counteroffer was unlikely
to impress a Congress that now had $163 million worth of gold sitting
in the bank. The State Department suggested another round of negoti-
ations in spring 1981 and Czechoslovakia agreed.
After months of negotiation, both governments initialed an agree-
ment in Prague on November 6, 1981, which provided for an $81.5
million settlement for United States citizens.7' This settlement figure
represented full payment of the principal owed, plus twenty-two per-
cent of the interest through 1958.72 Had the Yugoslavian benchmark
formula been used to compute the figure, the result would have been
less favorable to the Americans.73 Still, the process was not completed.
The agreement awaited approval of both houses of Congress. Also,
similar negotiations between Great Britain and Czechoslovakia were
still under way.
Czechoslovakia had now increased the amount of its proposed pay-
ment, perhaps because of a new "Wolff-like" claims bill, which had
begun its course through the Senate Finance Committee and the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. Bingham introduced H.R. 5125 into
the Ninety-seventh Congress on March 18, 1981, noting that both the
State Department and the claimants' attorneys had "equally compel-
ling legal arguments." In light of such parity, he stated, "I believe we
can and must take the course that delivers the greater equity to our
claimants."74 One way or the other, key members of Congress seemed
determined to settle this matter once and for all, and in a manner that
would assist the award holders before the price of gold plummeted. It
was a classic illustration of Congress' desire and right to protect the
interest of constituents, arguably the fundamental tenet of representa-
tive democracy.
During these events, Representatives Bingham and Hamilton and
Senator Moynihan provided the State Department and the Czechoslo-
vakian government another chance to negotiate a proper settlement by
providing the two parties with suggestions for an acceptable compro-
mise and allowing them time to reach an agreement. It was a delicate,
admirable balance the legislators had struck between forcing the issue
on behalf of constituents, on the one hand, and standing back to allow
the professional diplomats to practice their arts, on the other hand. Pri-
vately, State Department officials admitted reluctantly that this con-
71. Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1981, § A, at 22.
72. Id.
73. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
74. 127 CONG. REC. E1.163 (daily ed. March 18, 1981).
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gressional push might have been just what was needed to reach a
settlement at last.
75
Congress entered the diplomatic field once again, only this time in
an exemplary fashion as catalyst and questioner rather than negotiator.
On December 16, 1981, the last day of the First session of the Ninety-
seventh Congress, both Houses approved, with minor changes, the ne-
gotiated claims settlement between the United States and Czechoslova-
kia through passage of the Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act of
1981.7 ' This resolution will, one hopes, aid both the claimants and
United States-Czechoslovakia relations. Congress deserves much of
the praise for the successful outcome.
75. Interviews with a State Department desk officer for Czechoslovakia, December, 1980, Wash-
ington, DC.
76. Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-127, - Stat. - (1981): See
127 Coj(i. RF-. H9833-34 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 198 1). For the final round of hearings on this
subject in the House of Representatives. see Settlement of Claims Against Czechoslorakia:
/learings and ,fikup on H.R. 525 Before the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East and
the Suhcomm on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign
A.4 irs, 97th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1981).
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